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Abstract
Thoroughbred incentive programs are subsidy policies designed to promote regional race
horse breeding and ownership.  At issue, is an ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of
alternative policies.  Empirical results indicate the programs have a positive economic affect, but
gains in efficiency can be obtained by reallocating funds to open purses.  
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An Analysis Of The Economic Efficiency Of
Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Incentive Policies
Introduction
Subsidy policies for agricultural commodities have long been used as a means to manage
supply and augment demand.  Thoroughbred breeder/owner incentive programs are state
administered subsidy policies designed to promote regional race horse breeding and ownership. 
Currently, twenty-seven states operate incentive programs that transfer one-hundred million
dollars annually to the horse racing industry, (American Horse Council, 1995).  
Breeder/owner incentive programs are funded through a tax levied on parimutuel
wagering pools.  This share of tax revenue is transferred to owners and breeders under a variety
of alternative subsidy programs.  Washington operated an incentive program as early as 1945, and
many states initiated incentive programs in the 1960's and 1970's.  Each state has different policies
regarding the administration and levels of funding across the alternative incentive programs. 
Limited analysis exists evaluating the economic efficiency of the alternative breeder/owner
incentive program policies.  This has become of increasing concern due to the high levels of
expenditures, the limited growth in pari-mutual wagering pools across the nation, and states that
have recently introduced alternative gaming into pari-mutual racing markets seek to subsidize
pari-mutual racing and the regional thoroughbred industry in the most efficient manner possible. 
Additionally, incentive programs are a green space preservation policy.  In contrast to confined
animal feeding operations, horse farm and training facilities are environmentally sustainable due to
the large acreage of grassland required for proper horse management.  Green space preservation
is an issue not only in densely populated states such as New York and New Jersey, but also in the1 Generally, to be classified as a state bred, the foal must be conceived in the state, and the
mare must give birth in the state.
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primary thoroughbred production state of Kentucky.  The objective of this study is to examine the
economic effectiveness of breeder incentive program alternatives on the supply of registered foals
and the demand for the foals as they are sold as yearlings.
Background and Literature Review 
Incentive programs encourage thoroughbred breeding to expand the state’s agriculture
and to assure an adequate supply of horses for regional parimutuel racing.  Each states’ incentive
program differs in the distribution of transfer payments to the breeder/owner of state-bred horses
1
winning races across five alternative programs: Breeder awards transfer money to the breeder of
record of a state bred horse;  Stallion awards transfer money to stallion owners;  Owner awards
transfer money to the owner of a state bred horse winning a race open to all horses meeting the
race conditions regardless of state of breeding;  Restricted race owner awards transfer money to
the owner of a state bred horse winning a race restricted only to state bred horses;  And other
awards is a miscellaneous category for state bred stake races, stallion stakes, and other races
highlighting state bred horses.   
Restricted race owner awards accounts for fifty-three percent of the distribution of
incentive award payments.  Breeder and stallion awards account for twenty-two and five percent
of the distribution of incentive program payments respectively.  Open race owner awards accounts
for eighteen percent of the payment distribution, and other awards two percent.
Of particular interest is the difference in incentive program expenditure per registered foal
across states.  New York and New Jersey rank first and second in incentive program transfer2 Sire stakes are a restricted race for state bred colts.
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payments, which average over $11,000 per foal.  In comparison, Maryland ranks twelfth in
expenditures at over $2,000 per foal.  And, Kentucky which ranks first in foal crop, ranks twenty-
fifth in incentive payment transfers at $525 per foal. 
While there exists a number of studies examining agricultural commodity supply policies,
(Shumway, Smith and Richardson, 1995, and Sun, Kaiser and Forker, 1995) and demand policies,
(Alston, Carter and Smith, 1993, and Halliburton and Hennebery,1995), for example, there is
limited analysis concerning the effectiveness of thoroughbred breeder/owner subsidies.
Degennaro, 1989 examined the role of sire stakes
2 on the volume of wagering (handle) for
harness racing at Scioto Downs near Columbus Ohio.  A direct relationship between parimutuel
handle and sire stakes was not found, indicating  that the state-bred sire stakes program had no
economic impact on wagering.  However, the primary purpose of breeder/owner awards is to
promote regional race horse breeding and ownership.  The effectiveness of incentive programs on
promoting breeding can be measured through the supply of registered foals in the state.  The
effectiveness of promoting race horse ownership can be measured through the demand for
yearlings. 
The Model
The hypothesis to be tested is that breeder/owner incentive programs have a positive affect
on the supply and demand of thoroughbred bloodstock.  The empirical specification is based on a
structural thoroughbred yearling supply and demand model of inter-temporal equilibrium with
price expectations, Neibergs and Thalheimer, 1997, augmented to include breeder/owner subsidy4
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programs.  The proposed model is a set of state-level thoroughbred market models and can be
specified as follows:
Supply of Registered Foals
(1)
Foal to Yearling Transfer
(2)
Inverse Demand For Yearlings
(3)
where i = 1...n represents an index of state level variables.
A working description of the model is provided herein.  For a complete model description,
see Neibergs and Thalheimer, 1997.  Equation (1) represents a supply model of registered
thoroughbred foals, RFOALit.  The model is based on the hypothesis that breeders act in
accordance with the information available to them when breeding decisions are made in a way
represented by the interaction of thoroughbred yearling supply and demand.  Breeding decisions
are dependent on the expected price of yearlings.  The decision to breed a mare is made early in
year t, which is followed by an 11-month gestation period, to produce and register a foal in year
t+1.  The foal matures for a year and is sold as a yearling in year t+2.  Therefor supply decisions
are based in part on breeders’ price expectations two years in the future.  
Supply response is modeled where RFOALit responds to state average price for5
thoroughbred yearlings lagged two years, Pit-2, to represent price expectations and reproductive
constraints associated with breeding decisions as previously discussed.  Due to the high asset
fixity associated with thoroughbred breeding investments and the long biological lag associated
with breeding decisions, the supply of thoroughbred yearlings changes gradually over time.  The
stickiness in supply response is in part attributable to the large fixed capital investment associated
with horse production that is not easily liquidated, the small difference in marginal cost between a
bred mare versus a non-productive barren mare, and the biological constraints of reproduction. 
Also, many breeders may not be price responsive due to their willingness to subsidize their
thoroughbred investment through periods of non-profitability.   A partial adjustment process is
represented by a one period lag of the endogenous variable, RFOALit.
Breeder awards, BAit-2, and stallion awards, SAit-2, are transfer payments to thoroughbred
producers.  They impact the expected returns of breeding decisions and are included on the supply
side of the model.  Tax benefits are a primary consideration in thoroughbred investment decisions. 
Tax benefits are a better indication than tax costs of federal tax policy impacts on the yearling
market, because tax benefits apply equally to profitable and non-profitable investment decisions. 
The effects of changes in federal tax policy can be captured through an index that measures the
present value of tax benefits from a capital investment in a thoroughbred broodmare, MTBt-2. A
farm cost index, FCIt-2, represents input costs of production, and SFEEt-2, represents the national
average stud fee paid to breed a mare.  A stochastic error term is represented by µit.
Foal To Yearling Transfer
Thoroughbred foals are registered with the Jockey Club as weanlings shortly after they are6
born and become yearlings on the first January 1 after they are foaled.  Equation (2) is an identity
that transfers RFOALit to the supply of marketable yearlings, YRLit. Once a foal is registered, only
death prevents it from becoming a yearling.  Since death loss rates are unavailable and presumed
negligible and invariant over time, an identity is used to transfer foals to yearlings.  
The Demand Model
Demand for thoroughbred yearlings can best be represented as a capital investment
function.  Equation (3) represents an inverse demand function where the state average price of
yearlings, Pit, is a function of the predetermined supply of yearlings, YRLit, and a set of current
exogenous variables.  The price of a capital asset, a thoroughbred yearling being no exception, is
related to its earning potential.  For thoroughbred yearlings, those earnings are the purses for
which it competes, plus incentive program transfer payments targeting thoroughbred
yearling/race-horse owners.   The state average purse per race, PRSEit, restricted race purses,
RPRSEit, and owner awards, OAit, represents yearling earning potential.  
The yearling tax benefit, YTBt, represents the present value of the tax benefits from a
capital investment in a thoroughbred yearling, and is calculated in the same manner as MTBt-2. 
Foreign investment influences the thoroughbred yearling market.  The gross amount of foreign
purchases of thoroughbred yearlings, GFPt, and the exchange rate of United Kingdom for U.S.
dollars, EXRt, capture the export influences of demand on the thoroughbred market.  State per
capita income, PCIit, represents regional economic conditions. The stochastic error term is <it.
Because there is no direct feedback from the demand equation to the supply equation, the
specified model is recursive.  In a recursive system, each endogenous variables can be determined
sequentially.  Given values for Pit-2, one can solve directly for RFOALit in the supply equation. 7
Then, knowing RFOALit, the value of Pit can be solved recursively in the demand equation. 
Results and Discussion
Data availability constrained the scope of states included in the model.  A number of states
failed to maintain an archive of incentive program transfer payments.  Other states did not
conduct yearling auction sales, so data on Pit is unavailable in those states.  Three states are
included in the model based on the comparability of their thoroughbred industries.  Annual data
from 1966 to 1995 for Washington, Maryland and Ohio were analyzed.  These states represent a
geographical dispersion of thoroughbred production, and rank seventh, ninth and twelfth in foal
crop size.  
The specified state level thoroughbred yearling market was estimated using Kmenta’s
method of pooling cross-section time-series data, which assumes autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity (Kmenta, 1986).  Due to problems of multicollinearity in the supply model
between BAit-2 and SAit-2, the relatively small distribution of incentive transfer payments through 
SAit-2, and these awards largely target the same thoroughbred producer, they were combined into
one variable, BASAit-2, by adding them together.  A dummy variable for Maryland was included in
the model.  An extraordinary price drop occurred in 1974 to the present which reflects the export
of Maryland’s higher quality horses to more lucrative markets in Kentucky and New York
through the Fasig-Tipton auction house, Finney, 1990.  Estimated results are presented in Table
1.  Overall model results support the suggested model specification, based on the consistency of
estimated parameters with what is expected from economic theory, and statistical measures of
significance and goodness of fit.  
The supply model’s Buse R
2 of 0.97, and the Durbin-H statistic of 0.09 supports the3 (1-0.84)
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conclusions of an absence of serial correlation and proper model specification.  All variables in the
supply model are statistically significant.  The estimated parameter of RFOALt-1 of 0.84 results in
a coefficient of adjustment of 0.16
3 which substantiates the slow adjustment process of
thoroughbred supply response to changes in economic conditions.  Although SFEEt-2 is a
production cost and its anticipated sign is negative, the estimated sign is positive.  This may be
due to, as the thoroughbred industry expands, stud fees increase.  Producers are willing to pay
increased stud fees as they expect the marginal value product of YRLit to increase.
The Buse R
2 in the demand model is 0.84.  All model variables are statistically significant
except for variables measuring export influences of the market, GFPt and EXRt.  The states
included in the study are regional markets, and typically do not have the quality of horses to
attract international buyers.  The key model variables of PRSEt, RPRSEt and OAt are statistically
significant at a one percent level of significance or greater.  The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.91
indicates a proper model specification and the absence of serial correlation. All breeder/owner
incentive program variables are positive and statistically significant indicating they have a positive
economic impact.  Their elasticities are calculated to evaluate their effectiveness. 
Supply and Demand Parameter Elasticities
The short-run supply elasticities and price flexibilities presented in Table 3 are all inelastic,
with the exception of PRSEt which has a price flexiblity of 1.116. The price flexibility of owner
award programs OAt and RPRSEt are similar at 0.104 and 0.120.  Supply response to price is 
inelastic, 0.089, and breeder awards, BASAt is also inelastic, 0.078.  These results are consistent9
with the elasticities estimated by Neibergs and Thalheimer, 1997.  The price flexibility of PRSEt in
this study of 1.116 is lower than the purse flexibility estimated in Neibergs and Thalheimer, 1997,
of 2.606.  Two reasons may account for the lower response.  In Neibergs and Thalhemer, 1997
the purse variable was an aggregate of purses, restricted purses and owner awards, and it was a
national study, so the price variable had more variation. 
Long-Run Comparative Statics
The derivation of the final form of the model by substituting the supply model, equation
(1), into equation (3) takes into account the interaction of supply and demand simultaneously.  If
a disequilibrating change occurs in the form of a variation in an exogenous variable, the initial
equilibrium will be upset.  Endogenous variables (RFOAL and P) adjust relative to the new value
of the exogenous variable, plus the recursive adjustments between RFOAL and P until long-run
equilibrium is reached.  Long-run supply elasticities and price flexibilities of key model variables
are presented in Table 3.  The long-run elasticities can be used to rank the relative effectiveness of
the alternative breeder incentive programs. 
The policy in question is how to effectively allocate parimutuel pool revenues to promote
regional thoroughbred breeding.  Each state has the authority to allocate funds to the open race
purse account, PRSEit, or across its breeder award programs, RPRSEit, OAit, or BASAit.  The
long-run elasticities indicate that PRSE has the greatest affect on RFOAL with a long run
elasticity of 0.562, followed by BASA with a long-run elasticity of 0.440.  Although BASA is a
direct transfer payment to producers, thus stimulating foal supply, it works against itself by
decreasing price, because there is an increase in supply without a commensurate increase in
demand.  BASA has a long-run price flexibility of -0.097.  The breeding sector’s marginal revenue4 Total revenue to breeders is YRLt*Pt + BASAt.  BASAt = 0 when analyzing the policy to
increase purses.
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would increase by allocating revenue to PRSE over BASA, because PRSE increases both supply
and price.  The long-run price flexibility of PRSE is 0.971, and its supply elasticity is  0.562. 
Figure one illustrates the total revenue
4 effect to breeders in response to policy scenarios
that increases PRSEt or BASAt by ten percent.  The analysis is relative to a single state in the
study.  Starting from a point of long-run equilibrium, year 0, breeder revenue is $10.5 million. 
The policy options are initiated in year 1.  The policy option to increase PRSEt, results in an
immediate increase in Pt, so breeder revenue increases to $11.5 million.  Breeder revenue stays at
this level for the two year time lag required for breeders to adjust supply relative to an exogenous
shock.  From years 3 to 15, breeder revenue increases to $11.9 million as the market adjusts to
equilibrium.  In contrast, the policy option of increasing BASAt, increases breeder revenue to
$10.6 million in years one and two, reflecting only the increase in BASAt transfer payments. 
Starting in year three, breeder revenue increases as supply responds to the increase in BASAt, and
increases to $10.9 million by year 15.  The difference in total revenue between the two policy
options over the fifteen year simulation period is $14.9 million.
Conclusions
At issue, is an ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of alternative breeder/owner
incentive programs.  This study focuses on the incentive program’s objective of promoting the
regional breeding sector.  Empirical results indicate that breeder/owner awards have a positive
economic impact, but gains in efficiency can be obtained by reallocating funds to open purses. 
This policy may have further benefits outside of that identified by this model.  Increased purses
improves the quality of horses running in a race, and may increase the field size of the race, both of
which have been shown to increase parimutuel handle.  Additional research is needed along these
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resulting competition between horses, is the most efficient policy for thoroughbred breeding.
Table 1. Breeder/Owner Awards Affects On Yearling Market Empirical Results
Supply (RFOALt) Demand (Pt)






















































n 90 n 90
Buse R
2 0.97 Buse R
2 0.84
Durbin-Watson 1.96 Durbin-Watson 1.91
Durbin-H 0.09
Notes: The top number is the estimated parameter and the bottom number is the
T-statistic; single asterisk (
*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (
***) denote
rejection of H0 at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels respectively.
Figure 1.  Breeder Revenue From A 10% Increase in Purses Versus Breeder Awards.12
Table 2. Short-Run Supply Elasticities and Demand Flexibilities at the Mean. 
Supply (RFOALt) Demand (Pt)
Variable Estimated Result Variable Estimated Result
RFOALt-1 0.836 YRLt -0.220
Pt-2 0.089 PRSEt 1.116
BASAt-2 0.078 RPRSEt 0.120
MTBt-2 0.212 OAt 0.104
FCIt-2 -0.134 YTBt 0.725




PCIt -0.939        
Notes:
* indicates the estimated parameter is not statistically significant.     
Table 3. Long-Run Comparative Statics of Key Model Variables.













































1 The result is the evaluation of the comparative static using the estimated coefficients  
   from the supply and demand equations.
2 Elasticity and flexibility estimates are calculated at the mean.13
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       Table 1.  Alternative Breeder Incentive Program Options.
Program Option Distribution of Average
Total Incentives
Breeder Awards 22 percent
Owner Awards 18 percent
Stallion Owner Awards 5 percent
Restricted Purses 53 percent
Other Awards/Funding 2 percent
   Table 2.  Breeder Incentive Expenditures Per Foal.
  Foal Crop Total Per Foal
Rank State Num. Foals Rank Incentives
1 New York 1,579 9 11,364
2 New Jersey 581 14 11,100
3 Illinois 1,468 10 9,660
4 Ohio 1,010 11 6,206
5 Louisiana 1,711 6 5,188
6 West Virginia 442 19 4,188
7 California 3,946 2 4,031
8 Pennsylvania 872 12 3,667
9 Nebraska 546 15 3,626
10 Michigan 509 16 3,093
11 New Mexico 636 13 2,158
12 Maryland 1,581 8 2,061
13 Arkansas 457 18 1,686
14 Washington 1,610 7 1,501
15 Arizona 413 20 1,473
16 Oregon 289 22 1,462
17 Oklahoma 1,723 5 1,449
18 Florida 3,784 3 1,381
19 Minnesota 505 17 1,254
20 Massachusetts 125 26 1,088
21 Iowa 192 25 1,049
22 Kansas 243 24 658
23 Wyoming 46 28 635
24 South Dakota 81 27 632
25 Kentucky 7,274 1 525
26 Idaho 347 21 414
27 Colorado 252 23 282
28 Texas 2,294 4 22015
Policy Scenarios
Blood Horse, July 19 page 3824 .  The approach is firmly grounded in the Irish racing
experience, where purses are currently estimated to cover barley one-fifty of training costs and
selling horses and stallion services has long been the only way for professional horsemen to
produce regular profits.  Coolmore also has taken full advantage of Irish fiscal policies that levy
no tax at all on stallion values or stallion income.  Adopted in 1969 as and economic incentive to
horse breeding in Ireland, the policies have encouraged numerous other major European breeders
to maintaining Irish breeding farms and patronize Irish stallions.  
Future work ? Field size and handle?  Socially optimal solution for the region?